Facing the chaos: what prospects for the 2027 French presidential election?
This morning, I gave a long interview to the Japanese television channel Nippon TV, for the news programme ‘Finsō NEWS’. I have transcribed my remarks with the Notta software. In this text, I return to the key issues of the presidential election: why is Marine Le Pen the favourite? Are the candidates' promises deliverable? What can be done about the debt, the protests and law and order? What kind of president do the French hope for?
How do you analyse the situation ahead of the presidential election? Why is Marine Le Pen so popular?
We are witnessing the end of a cycle for our institutions. Since the 1990s, the parties of government, on the right as on the left, have failed to solve the country's problems. Voters draw a logical conclusion from this: they turn away from those who have exercised power and towards those who promise to change everything. Added to this rejection is a widely shared sense of overall decline (economic, social, cultural, environmental, geopolitical...). For these reasons, the political landscape has fragmented to an extraordinary degree: eleven groups have coexisted in the National Assembly since 2024, which makes any stable majority improbable.
This configuration, which forces the government to confine itself to routine business and to try to limit the scale of the public deficit, fuels the populist parties. They promise to solve everything with simple measures and have never exercised power – and have therefore never disappointed. The situation is by no means specifically French: in many EU countries, as in the United States and Latin America, populists, particularly on the far right, are leading the polls or are already in power...
Marine Le Pen is proposing spending cuts, and the government aims to reduce the deficit: is this even possible?
It is extremely complicated, so large is the deficit: around 160 billion euros in 2026. France is structurally in deficit; our entire social and economic system rests upon it. Social spending accounts for roughly one third of GDP, and the State also heavily supports the economy and private companies. The various branches of the civil service employ more than five million people.
Yet it is politically impossible to touch the advantages of any given group, and the parties act as advocates for everyone's interests: each electorate has « its » party to defend « its » acquired rights. In such a fragmented political landscape, reducing the budget is an impossible equation.
Marine Le Pen has, like every candidate, put forward proposals to reduce the deficit, but they are hardly serious: economists joke about them more than they discuss them.
What should we make of Ms Le Pen's promises to cut France's contribution to the European budget, or to suspend aid to Ukraine?
This is pure populism, because these are not what is driving the deficits. Aid to Ukraine amounts to less than 2 billion euros a year, out of 500 billion euros of State expenditure; the contribution to the European Union budget stands at around 30 billion, but France recovers almost as much through the common agricultural policy and regional policies. In total, one would « save » barely 5 billion out of a deficit of 160, while creating considerable tensions with our partners – and, ultimately, leaving the European Union. Ms Le Pen is a deep-rooted Eurosceptic, even if she no longer openly admits it, but unilaterally cutting the country's contribution to the Union's budget would amount to leaving it. Her proposals are less a serious budgetary programme than arguments designed to impress with simple solutions and, possibly, to please Moscow and Washington...
Do policies that prioritise the national interest resonate favourably with voters?
Yes, and that is precisely the populists' calculation: a short-term calculation, based on the least well-informed voters. The scapegoat strategy works – the European Union, Mr Zelensky, immigrants, bankers... all shoulder the blame for our ills.
This way of looking at things reassures those who believe in it, but frightens the others, including at European level: the tensions with Ms Meloni over financial support for Ukraine bear witness to this, and the prospect of a Le Pen victory worries even our most conservative European partners.
Has the RN's strategy of « de-demonisation » been successful?
Yes. It has made voting for the RN acceptable to a growing share of our fellow citizens, particularly among voters who come from the moderate right. Today, Ms Le Pen and Mr Bardella are among the politicians with the best image in France. The racist and antisemitic remarks that long kept the party banished from democratic life have almost disappeared since Jean-Marie Le Pen withdrew, and antisemitic allusions today come rather from the far left.
Admittedly, scandals regularly erupt, such as those that have affected Jordan Bardella. But the party's supporters do not care – as recent opinion polls show – and the rest of the population is not surprised to learn that he may have made antisemitic and racist remarks when he was younger, because it is in the party's DNA.
In any case, the RN's candidate is Marine Le Pen, not Jordan Bardella, and she controls her communication rather well and takes care of her image. She has done groundwork to win over second-round voters – those who must resign themselves to voting for her for want of anything better.
Marine Le Pen was found guilty of embezzlement of public funds. Has this not weakened her?
Not among RN voters, who do not care – exactly as Donald Trump's supporters shrug off his many skeletons in the cupboard. The affair does, however, weigh somewhat on second-round voters: older citizens may be reluctant to vote for a candidate wearing an electronic tag, given their attachment to probity and respect for the law.
But the polls show that the impact is minor, because the RN has widely spread the idea that « all elected officials are corrupt » and that Marine Le Pen was targeted by « red » judges. In such matters, everyone believes what suits them. Moreover, the RN vote is driven more by anger and a desire for revenge than by trust in Ms Le Pen's competence and probity.
What policies could Marine Le Pen pursue, domestically and internationally?
It is hard to say. If she came to power, she would have to contend with many constraints – budgetary, legal, international – which would probably limit her ability to implement her programme. Above all, she would have to find a majority in the National Assembly, and would therefore no doubt have to form an alliance with part of the traditional right, which would reject the most extreme measures.
One can put forward a hypothesis « à la Meloni »: a radical and conservative domestic policy – law and order, immigration, values, culture, a reform of the Constitution aimed at restricting the rule of law... – and a more moderate international policy, so as not to panic the markets and not to fall out with France's European partners. That would, in any event, be the least constraining option for Ms Le Pen.
The far-left candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, could also worsen financial instability. How do voters perceive his proposals?
Mr Mélenchon pays little heed to the deficit and the debt, as he considers these are not really matters of concern. In doing so, he frightens the business community and the markets. His programme – taxing the rich and massively increasing public spending – comes with no serious assessment of its impact on the economy: companies leaving the country, bankruptcies, job losses, relocations, falling investment...
Like Ms Le Pen, he does not call for leaving the Union, but he holds positions that would make it difficult to avoid, for instance by refusing to apply whole swathes of European law. But his voters do not care: they do not believe in the existing system and want to overthrow it. It is an anger vote, exactly like the RN vote: whatever the consequences, « it cannot be worse than today ».
Jean-Luc Mélenchon has reportedly raised the possibility of cancelling the country's debt altogether. Do you think that is possible?
I do not know: it is such an extreme proposal that it would, in reality, amount to the bankruptcy of the country. We would find ourselves in the situation of Argentina in 2001. But unlike Ms Le Pen, who seems chiefly concerned with acquiring power and money, Mr Mélenchon is an ideologue, steeped in radical thinking. He hates banks, and might reckon that France can do without them. Moreover, he has always said he wants his party's programme implemented in full, without any negotiation possible, which opens the way to the most radical decisions.
Opinion polls make Marine Le Pen the favourite. What about Jean-Luc Mélenchon? What would it take to beat the others?
At present – although things are constantly changing, and six months of campaigning remain – Mr Mélenchon is favourite to reach the second round, behind Ms Le Pen. Thanks to the events of recent weeks, he enjoys the support of school pupils and students: about half of 18-25 year-olds are preparing to vote for him.
But he would lose the second round in every scenario, whether against Marine Le Pen or against a candidate from a more moderate party, because his image among the population is dire: he is by far the most disliked candidate on the whole political spectrum. Moreover, he is feared by the actors of the economy – banks, businesses, wealth holders... – who will do everything to prevent him from coming to power, and who consider that the election of Marine Le Pen would be the lesser evil.
Is it difficult for moderate candidates to unite?
Yes, because there are too many of them: five or six main ones, plus a dozen in the antechamber waiting for their moment, when there is room for only two. Traditionally, the selection of the parties of government followed a simple rule: the leaders of the Socialist Party and of the conservative party stood. But there is no longer a « natural candidate », and it is a free-for-all.
Everyone can therefore hope to win, all the more so as Nicolas Sarkozy (2007), François Hollande (2012) and Emmanuel Macron (2017) were elected against all the odds – none of them was the favourite six months before the election. But a clarification has taken place on the left, with Raphaël Glucksmann's victory in the Socialist primary; it will no doubt also happen on the right, to reduce the number of candidates. This clarification will take place in the light of the polls, to leave the field open to the candidate with the best chance of succeeding.
This makes the game very uncertain, and some candidates who, a priori, have no chance of success may nevertheless persist. It is therefore impossible to know who will face Marine Le Pen in the second round: a representative of the radical left, of the governing left or of the right.
Would a moderate candidate stand a chance against Marine Le Pen in the second round?
According to the polls, yes. Mr Mélenchon is forecast to lose heavily, but candidates such as Édouard Philippe or Raphaël Glucksmann are not far from a majority. They enjoy a better image than the LFI leader, can rally voters beyond their own camp, and would appear as a reasonable choice – the least bad option, as Emmanuel Macron was in 2022. For the time being, Ms Le Pen is very high in the polls, but experience has shown (2012, 2017, 2022) that she is a poor debater when it comes to facing the other candidates on a television set and defending her programme.
How will the candidates exploit these demonstrations and riots to their advantage?
The advantage lies with the radicals. Mr Mélenchon considers that the protesters are calling him to power, that they vindicate his analysis of the country's situation and of the remedies to apply. And Ms Le Pen claims that LFI is orchestrating the movement, and presents herself as the only one capable of restoring order in the country and averting chaos.
For the other candidates, the exercise is more difficult: they represent the parties held responsible for the country's economic and social situation, and many of them are former ministers of Mr Macron – Messrs Philippe, Attal, Retailleau... They have little to offer the protesters, because there is no budget leeway (the Yellow Vests obtained 17 billion euros) and because their demands are fairly disparate, or relate to phenomena that are not directly within the remit of the public authorities (cost of living, fuel prices, threats linked to artificial intelligence, racism, conflicts around the world, the situation in Gaza, climate change...).
Has President Macron failed to maintain law and order? What are his challenges on this subject?
Clearly, the government and the police forces were overwhelmed by the situation on 17 October 2026, during the « convergence of struggles » demonstration. The arrangements planned were inadequate: looters and rioters were able to have a field day, while peaceful protesters came up against police forces that very quickly resorted to tear gas and heavy-handed methods.
The difficulty for the public authorities is to reconcile two imperatives.
The first is to respect the right to protest, which is essential in French political culture and to which citizens are deeply attached. It goes back to the Revolution of 1789 and has been expressed regularly ever since – 1830, 1848, 1870, 1968... France has seen many mobilisations against reform, led by students, lorry drivers, taxi drivers, farmers, dockers, or movements such as the Yellow Vests. It is also a matter of avoiding an incident: the death of a protester at the hands of the police, which would probably be regarded as unremarkable in the United States, would trigger an unprecedented crisis in France and bring down the government.
The second imperative is to uphold order and to protect people, institutions and property. Many citizens follow the riots on social media or in front of their television, powerless and frightened spectators of the damage and the fires. These exactions are confined to a few places in France, but they give the impression that the country is ablaze, and reinforce the idea that the country has not been governed since 2024, or even 2022.
The path is therefore narrow for the government, and the risks are immense. The oppositions do not help: Mr Mélenchon wants to « raise hell » in the country, to turn everything into a conflict, and refuses to take sides between the looters and the police; Ms Le Pen paints a country prey to chaos and calls for vigorous repression. Social media and pro-Russian, pro-Chinese and MAGA media pour oil on the fire, and there are no doubt activists under foreign influence – which would explain the spread of the movement to Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Albania...
What kind of president do the French want?
The French always hope for a providential man or woman. The model remains, in spite of all the criticism levelled at the French political system, General de Gaulle. Citizens hope for a strong and powerful president, with a firm character, a good speaker, a charismatic leader. François Hollande tried to play the card of the « normal » president, but it did not work out for him.
The fact remains that this providential president always disappoints, and his decline in popularity comes earlier each time: as in the United States, there is no longer even a hundred-day honeymoon. France is sick of its presidential election: it pollutes the country's political life, turns political parties into presidential stables, makes it impossible for a majority to emerge in the National Assembly, and creates permanent tensions in the public sphere. It pushes candidates to make reckless promises and to present themselves as the president of renewal: every election therefore ends, sooner or later, in disappointment. In short, the president has become the person the French love to hate.
Does all this favour the populist candidates?
Absolutely. It is easier to promise the moon when you are a populist, when you claim that France's European and international commitments do not matter, that you want to challenge the rule of law, or that you are considering cancelling the French debt. This answers the expectations of citizens who hope for radical change and care little whether the method is realistic.
Moderate candidates, for their part, must make reasonable, funded, lawful proposals, respectful of the Constitution and of the country's international commitments, sparing the interests of everyone, and reassuring the holders of the country's debt. It is very difficult for them to make people dream and to promise meaningful change to citizens who are unhappy with their lot.
That is the central paradox of our democracy today: voters demand dreams, but the serious candidates can only offer them effort.
Olivier Costa Olivier.costa@sciencespo.fr
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